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A trademark does not confer a right to prohibit the use of the word or
words. It is not a copyright .... A trademark only gives the right to
prohibit the use of it so far as it protects the owner's goodwill against
the sale of another's product as his.'
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Carl E. Stewart, Circuit Judge, United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. J.D., 2002, Tulane Law School, A.B., 1993, Brown
University.
1. Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924) (Holmes, J.).
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I. Introduction
Notwithstanding Justice Holmes' early recognition of a limitation
on the extent to which trademark law may be used by mark holders to
assert exclusive ownership of words, legislators, courts, and
commentators continue to struggle over where to delineate the
appropriate boundary between the spheres of private property and free
speech rights protection. This conflict is particularly pronounced in the
context of domain name disputes between trademark owners and
individuals who register and use domain names incorporating another's
marks to direct Internet users to web sites containing critical commentary
on the mark owners' enterprises. Trademark law has traditionally
embodied the dual policy objectives of preventing consumer confusion
and deception and protecting producers' investment in the creation,
marketing, and advertising of their products "from pirates and cheats." 2
Protection of the free dissemination of ideas similarly serves a public
interest by fostering robust public debate, which enables consumers to
make an informed choice when purchasing goods by alerting them to
quality or safety considerations and the relative advantages or
disadvantages presented by a particular product.3
However, the peaceful coexistence of these two forms of rights
protection has been disrupted recently by two significant developments
in the area of trademark law. First, in the United States, trademark
protection has undergone judicial and legislative expansion, driven by a
shift in underlying policy objectives from consumer protection to the
protection of economic investment. 4  Consequently, the value of
trademarks has ceased to be primarily in their use as a source identifier,
but rather lies in their value as products in themselves, at times without
regard to whether their contested use by another creates a likelihood of
consumer confusion.5 The corollary is that a premium has been placed
on the protection of private property ownership rather than on the
dissemination of information to the public. Second, and
contemporaneously with this expansion, the Internet's rapid development
as a marketplace of both ideas and goods has posed new challenges to
2. S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946).
3. See Shaughnessy, supra note 3, at 1103.
4. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 371
(1999); Alanna C. Rutherford, Sporty's Farm v. Sportsman's Market: A Case Study in
Internet Regulation Gone Awry, 66 BROOK. L. REv. 421, 436 (2000); infra notes -62
and accompanying text.
5. Lunney, supra note 4, at 371; William W. Fisher III, The Growth of Intellectual
Property: A History of the Ownership of Ideas in the United States (1999), available at
http://eon.law.harvard.edu/property99/history.htmI (last visited Sept. 13, 2004); FRANK
SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO TRADEMARKS
(1925); H. NIMS, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS (1909).
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trademark protection, which had historically been circumscribed by
geography and the categorization of goods corresponding to a particular
mark.6 While traditionally certain marks could be used by multiple
entities operating in different geographic markets or in conjunction with
non-competing goods,7 a domain name is both global and unique,
precluding such concurrent use on the Internet, which itself lacks any
discernible geographic boundaries. 8 Because Internet users tend to intuit
web addresses of the companies they seek by merely entering the
corporate name followed by a generic top level domain (gTLD) such as
<.com>, 9 both trademark owners and speculators, or cybersquatters,
quickly recognized that domain names that match marks are valuable
assets that can function as "business identifiers important to offering
goods and services on the Internet."' 10 An intuitive domain name,
however, may also present the most effective means for members of the
public to direct Internet users to a site expressing their views about a
trademark owner or its product." Further intensifying the competition
between these groups for use of particular domain names is a lack of any
effective regulatory control over domain name registration; domain
names are assigned primarily on a first-come first-served basis by non-
governmental bodies without any inquiry into potential conflicts between
the requested domain name and registered trademarks.' 2
In response to concerns expressed by businesses that traditional
trademark and unfair competition remedies afforded inadequate
protection against the bad faith registration of their marks as domain
names by non-trademark owners for commercial gain (cybersquatting),
Congress intervened in 1999 by enacting the Anti-Cybersquatting
6. Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering:
Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1304 (1998).
7. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1997); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25:73, at 25-149 (4th ed. 2001) (noting that
the Lanham Act section 2(d) allows "more than one registrant [to] obtain registration of
the same or similar mark, but for different parts of the nation [provided] that such
concurrent registration cannot be likely to cause confusion of buyers or others").
8. Radin & Wagner, supra note 6, at 1304.
9. H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 5 (1999); Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West
Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Web users often assume, as a
rule of thumb, that the domain name of a particular company will be the company name
followed by <.com>."); MCCARTHY, supra note 7, at § 25:73.
10. Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, 273 F.3d 14, 15 (1st Cir. 2001);
Cardservice Int'l v. McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737, 741 (E.D. Va. 1997), affd, 129 F.3d 1258
(4th Cir. 1997).
11. See Milton Mueller, Rough Justice: An Analysis of ICANN's Uniform Dispute
Resolution Policy (2000), available at http://dcc.syr.edu/report.htm.
12. Sallen, 273 F.3d at 19-20 (citing G.B. DELTA & J.H. MATSUURA, LAW OF THE
INTERNET § 5.04[B], at 5.58.2 (2001)); Sporty's Farm v. Sportsman's Mkt., 202 F.3d 489,
493 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 2719 (2000).
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Consumer Protection Act (ACPA). 13  That same year, the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a private non-
profit organization authorized by the U.S. Department of Commerce
(DoC) to manage the domain name system, implemented the Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) to afford trademark
owners an additional non-judicial avenue of recourse against clear cases
of abusive cybersquatting in the form of an expedited administrative
proceeding. 14
Although both of these schemes purport to protect the property
interests of trademark owners while preserving the rights of Internet
users to engage in fair or non-commercial use of others' marks, 15 this
article contends that the UDRP enables trademark owners to abusively
bypass judicial resolution of "legitimate disputes over trademark
rights."' 16  Specifically, by facilitating the overassertion of trademark
rights by businesses in order to strip domain names from their rightful
owners, the UDRP provides trademark owners with an end-run around
the countervailing fair use and free speech limitations posed by state and
federal trademark law and the U.S. Constitution. Moreover, neither the
UDRP provision permitting independent judicial resolution of domain
name disputes nor its reciprocal ACPA provision allowing injunctive
relief to a domain name registrant erroneously deprived of a domain
name by a UDRP panel afford adequate recourse for an aggrieved
domain name registrant.
Part II of this article describes the overlapping source identifying
capacity of domain names and trademarks and their functional
dissimilarities which have generated proprietary disputes between mark
owners and registrants that lie at the confluence of trademark and First
Amendment law. Part II also discusses the judicial and legislative
expansion of trademark rights to encompass protection against dilution,
in order to demonstrate the threat posed by this cause of action to fair use
and free speech rights. In Part III, this article contrasts the scope of
trademark protection afforded by the ACPA with that conferred by the
UDRP, focusing particularly on the interrelationship between their bad
faith factors and legitimate non-commercial or fair use defenses to a
13. PuB. L. No. 106-113, TITLE III, 113 STAT. 1501A-545 (1999) (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1114,1116-17,1125, 1127 & 1129 (1994 & Supp. 1999)).
14. See Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, available at
http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm [UDRP] (last visited Sept. 13, 2004).
15. See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 19-20 (quoting 145 CONG. REC. S 10, 515 (1999) (Senator
Hatch)); ICANN, Second Staff Report on Implementation Documents for the Uniform
Dispute Resolution Policy, at 4.1(c) (Oct. 25, 1999), available at http://www.icann.org/
udrp/udrp-second-staff-report-24oct99.htm (ICANN Second Staff Report) (last visited
Sept. 13, 2004).
16. Sallen, 273 F.3d at 17; see 145 Cong. Rec. S15,026 (1999).
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cybersquatting claim. Part IV examines recent UDRP panel decisions to
illustrate how the UDRP's expansive trademark protection, coupled with
its even more expansive construction by panelists, facilitates misuse of
the administrative proceedings by trademark owners to deprive
registrants of free expression rights. In Part V, this article proposes a
framework for harmonizing the competing interests of trademark owners
and Internet users that advocates procedural and substantive reform of
the UDRP or, alternatively, several changes to the current methods of
assignment and use of domain names. Finally, this article concludes that
the current use of the UDRP to resolve disputes involving competing
legitimate claims to trademark and free expression rights both exceeds
the UDRP's mandate and confers upon trademark owners a near absolute
property right to their marks that is unsupported by U.S. trademark law
and impinges upon fair use and free speech rights protected by the First
Amendment.
II. Background
A. The Functional Conflict Between Domain Names and Trademarks
A domain name is a hierarchical "alphanumeric designation which
is registered or assigned by any domain name registrar... as part of an
electronic address on the internet"1 7 consisting of a generic top level
domain (gTLD), such as <.com>, <.net.>, or <.org>, preceded by at least
one second level domain consisting of a mnemonic string of letters that
pinpoints the corresponding website's location on the Internet.18  As
location identifiers, domain names serve a "non-trademark technological
purpose" analogous to a radio station's frequency which, when "used in a
utilitarian sense of calling a listener's attention to a location on the FM
dial,,' 19 is not entitled to trademark protection.2° However, a domain
name that ceases to serve only a purely technological function as an
address and instead dually functions as an identifier of a source of goods
or services may effectively become a trademark and, as such, "can be
used to infringe [the] trademark rights [of others]. 21 It is this source
17. 15U.S.C. § 1127.
18. For example, in the domain name www.law.tulane.edu, ".edu" is the gTLD;
"tulane" is the second level domain; and "law" is the third level domain.
19. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 956 (C.D.
Cal. 1997) (quoting Walt-West Enters., Inc. v. Gannett Co., Inc., 695 F.2d 1050, 1059-60
(7th Cir. 1982)).
20. Id.; MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 7:17:1.
21. Lockheed, 985 F. Supp. at 956 (citing Accuride Int'l v. Accuride Corp., 871 F.2d
1531 (9th Cir. 1989).
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identifying function shared by trademarks and domain names 22 that
makes domain names valuable to both trademark owners and non-owner
domain name registrants: A domain name that incorporates a particular
mark facilitates the ability of the intuitive Internet browsing individual to
locate a web site devoted to the trademark holder's enterprise.
Yet, the current conflict between trademark owners and cyber
commentators 23 over their respective entitlements to assert exclusive
ownership of such domain names stems more from the dissimilar
functions served by trademarks and domain names than from their
overlapping capacity to identify the origin or sponsorship of a good or
service. Trademarks also serve as valuable "merchandising short-cut[s]"
which induce consumers to select particular products that they desire, or
which they have been led to believe they desire through advertising and
promotion of the corresponding goods.24 Distinctively, domain names
have the additional capacity to convey a communicative message, and as
such can constitute protected speech.25 Indeed, the Second Circuit has
observed that domain names may be used for a variety of communicative
purposes with elements of source identifying functionality and
expression "ranging from the truly mundane street address or telephone
number-like identification of the specific business that is operating the
website, to commercial speech and even core political speech squarely
implicating First Amendment concerns."2 6 Accordingly, courts have
generally ruled that the First Amendment protects a defendant's right to
the use of another entity's mark when that person's use of the mark "is
part of a communicative message," but not when the mark "is used to
identify the source of a product., 27 Whether the mix of functionality and
expressive elements is "sufficiently imbued with the elements of
22. See Radin & Wagner, supra note 6, at 1303.
23. This article uses the term "cyber commentators" rather than the more common
"cyber gripers" to include legitimate non-commercial and fair usage such as parodist and
fan sites, neither of which necessarily criticizes the targeted mark owner's entity.
24. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205
(1942) (Frankfurter, J.) (observing that "[t]he protection of trademarks is the law's
recognition of the psychological function of symbols); Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Prior
Restraints and Intellectual Property: The Clash Between Intellectual Property and the
First Amendment, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 44-45 (2001).
25. E.g., Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 584 (2d Cir.
2000).
26. Name.Space, Inc., 202 F.3d at 584 (rejecting the district court's conclusion that
domain names exclusively serve a source identifying function akin to telephone numbers
rather than as communicative messages).
27. Planned Parenthood Federation of Am. v. Bucci, No. 97 Civ. 0629, 1997 WL
133313, at *10-11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997), aff'd, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998)
(unpublished table decision), cert. denied, Bucci v. Planned Parenthood Federation of
Am., 525 U.S. 834 (1998) (citing Yankee Publ'g, Inc. v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 809 F.
Supp. 267, 275-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)).
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communication" to be entitled to First Amendment protection "depends
on the domain name in question, the intentions of the registrant, the
contents of the website, and the technical protocols that govern the
[domain name system]. 28
Until recently, federal trademark protection under the Lanham Act
and supplemental state trademark infringement and unfair competition
remedies aimed to protect the source identifying function of marks by
conferring upon trademark owners the right to exclude others from the
unauthorized commercial use of their distinctive marks "in connection
with any goods or services" only to the extent necessary to prevent
consumer deception and confusion.29  Thus, absent a showing that a
defendant's use of the mark created a likelihood of consumer confusion
as to the source or sponsorship of its related goods; the unauthorized use
would not constitute trademark infringement. 30  Factors weighed in
assessing whether the contested use of a mark creates a likelihood of
confusion include: (1) the strength of the plaintiffs mark; (2) the
similarity between the parties' marks; (3) the similarity between the
parties' products; (4) the likelihood that the senior mark owner will
bridge the gap; (5) actual confusion; (6) the junior user's good or bad
faith in adopting its mark; (7) the quality of the defendant's product; and
(8) the sophistication of the relevant consumer group. 31 No single factor
is dispositive; rather, courts rely upon a fact-intensive examination of the
totality of the circumstances.
Notably, while a defendant's showing of fair use may overcome a
finding of likelihood of confusion in a trademark infringement action,
such a fair use defense is restricted to the defendant's good faith use of a
term that matches a mark "only to describe the goods or services of such
party, or their geographic origin," but not when the term is used in its
trademark capacity to identify the origin of the goods.32 As long as
28. Name.Space, Inc., 202 F.3d at 585 (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,
409-10 (1974)).
29. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a)(1)(A). The Lanham Act provides, in pertinent part:
Any person who,... in connection with any goods or services .... uses in
commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device ... which... is likely to
cause confusion [or] ... mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection,
or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities
by another person.... shall be liable in a civil action by any person who
believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
Id.
30. Id.; see, e.g., Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161,
1163 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
31. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961)
(Friendly, J.).
32. Lanham Act § 33(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 11 15(b)(4) (1994) (providing that fair use
2004]
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trademark law primarily aimed to protect the source identifying function
of trademarks by preventing consumer deception and confusion, the
"likelihood of confusion" standard and its attendant fair use defense
implicitly balanced the competing property rights of trademark holders
against the free expression rights of the public by precluding trademark
owners from having a monopoly on their preferred words.33 Specifically,
consumer confusion-predicated relief limits the trademark owner's right
to appropriate words from the commons for his or her exclusive use by
effectively allowing the imposition of infringement liability only when
the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public
interest in fostering free expression.
34
B. Expanding Trademark Protection: Towards an Absolute Property
Right
Increasing support for the notion that "trademarks serve primarily as
a marketing tool and only secondarily as a [source identifier], 35 has
gradually generated demand for expansion of trademark rights in order to
protect the positive association and "drawing power of... congenial
3 6
marks from dilution. This trend developed in recognition that even non-
confusing concurrent usage of marks by others on non-competing goods
could cause the "gradual whittling away or dispersion of the trademark's
identity and hold upon the public mind., 37  In contrast to trademark
infringement relief, dilution relief "shifts the focus away from consumer
protection and towards the protection of an owner's property right" 38 in
the "potency" of a famous mark itself, by guarding the mark's "selling
power" and the economic investment that that magnetism represents.
39
requires (1) use of a term other than as a mark, (2) use in a descriptive sense, and (3) use
in good faith).
33. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. c (1995).
34. See Charles Atlas, Ltd. v. DC Comics, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 330, 337 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (citing Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, 886 F.2d 490,
494 (2d Cir. 1989); see also Yankee Publ'g Inc. v. News Am. Publ'g Inc., 809 F. Supp.
267, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)).
35. Robert J. Shaughnessy, Note, Trademark Parody: A Fair Use and First
Amendment Analysis, 72 VA. L. REv. 1079, 1086 (1986); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. b (1995).
36. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg., v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205
(1942) (Frankfurter, J.).
37. Frank L. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L.
REv. 813,818 (1927).
38. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 955 F. Supp. 605, 613 n.7 (E.D. Va. 1997), ajfd, 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 286 (1999).
39. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 473 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing
Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 456), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom., Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
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To that end, traditional dilution doctrine extends to conduct that either
blurs or tarnishes a famous mark. Blurring occurs when a junior user's
unauthorized use of a senior user's famous mark on dissimilar goods or
dissimilar services lessens the mark's capacity to function as a "unique
identifier" of the mark owner's goods or services. 40  The underlying
rationale is that if a strong mark such as Kodak were used on "pianos,
shaving cream, and fountain pens," the mark would "inevitably be lost in
the commonplace words of the language," notwithstanding "the
originality and ingenuity in [its] contrivance, and the vast expenditures in
its advertis[ement]. 41 Dilution resulting from tarnishment occurs when
a famous mark is used with an unwholesome association that diminishes
the mark,42 harming the "positive, quality-connoting associations the
holder has labored to create through advertisement and promotion. 43
Thus, although "conceptually distinct," both blurring and tarnishment
"reduce the value of the mark to the trademark owner," the former "by
disturbing the conditioned association of the mark with the prior user and
the [latter] by displacing positive with negative associations. 44
Historically, courts and commentators cautioned against the
adoption of dilution theory to protect trademark rights, fearing that "the
uncertain limits of the antidilution cause of action would unduly expand
the ability of trademark owners to monopolize language and inhibit free
competition. '45 Tarnishment protection poses the greatest threat to free
expression. Both trademark usage of another's mark as a source
identifier and nontrademark, expressive usage of such a mark to
comment on, criticize, disparage, or parody the mark owner's goods or
services can tarnish the positive quality-connoting associations of a
mark.4 6 "Kmart sucks," when stated by an unauthorized user of the
mark, may very well damage "the mental images associated with [the]
mark" as much as that user's trademark usage of the mark to identify his
or her own goods that "suck. 'A7 Yet, extension of tarnishment to prohibit
such nontrademark use "raises substantial free speech issues and
duplicates other potential remedies better suited to balance the relevant
interests. 4a  For that reason, the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
COMPETITION § 25 cmt. a (1995).
40. Ronald Abramson, Internet Domain Litigation, 1999, 558 PLI/PAT 7, 19 (1999).
41. Schechter, supra note-, at 830; see Moseley, 259 F.3d at 473.
42. See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 1987).
43. Elliot B. Staffin, The Dilution Doctrine: Towards A Reconciliation with the
Lanham Act, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 105, 131 (1995).
44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. c (1995).
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Competition provides that non-trademark use of another's mark that does
not create a likelihood of consumer confusion will not be subject to
dilution liability unless the defendant's "conduct meets the requirements
of a cause of action for defamation, invasion of privacy, or injurious
falsehood. 4 9 In contrast to trademark infringement and dilution claims,
these "alternative torts" require proof that the defendant acted with actual
malice, recklessness, or negligence, which are "well-developed
limitations [that] can better accommodate the actor's right of free
expression," and which may be "constitutionally required in order to
subject a speaker to liability."5 °
Despite these concerns, Congress codified the dilution doctrine as
an amendment to the Lanham Act with its 1995 enactment of the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA). 51 That amendment entitles the owner
of a famous mark to nationwide injunctive relief "against another
person's commercial use in commerce" of his or her famous mark, "if
such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of
the distinctive quality of the mark,, 52 and to damages for willful
dilution.53 With the FTDA, Congress conferred a near absolute property
right upon trademark owners to exclude even non-competitors from the
unauthorized dilutive use of their "famous and distinctive" marks in
commerce, without regard to whether such use entails a likelihood of
consumer confusion, deception, or mistake.54 This veritable monopoly
on words exists notwithstanding the FTDA's express exemption of
noncommercial use, comparative advertising, and parody, because
ascertaining the appropriate boundary between trademark and free
speech rights requires courts to make a distinction between the source
identifying functionality and expressive purposes of marks that is often
indiscernible in practice.
55
In the Internet context, the adoption of a federal dilution action
enhanced existing remedies against certain abusive domain name
registration practices of cybersquatters that had previously eluded
49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. i (1995). Id. § 25(2);
see id. cmt. i (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A (1976) (prohibiting false
statements harmful to the financial interests of another)); id. § 626 (prohibiting false
statements that disparage the quality of another's goods).
50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25, cmt. i.
51. PUB. L. No. 104-98, 109 STAT. 985 (1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c)).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
53. Id. § 1125(c)(2).
54. Seeid. §1125(c)(1).
55. See Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 584 (2d Cir.
2000) (observing that the source identifying and expressive purposes of domain names
are not mutually exclusive and thus require a highly context-specific inquiry to ascertain
whether they merit free speech protection).
[Vol. 109:2
LEX CYBERUS
consumer confusion-based infringement theories. For example, while
the registration and use of a domain name that matches another's mark in
conjunction with a web site that offers to sell "non-competing and non-
confusing" goods or that disparages the mark would rarely create the
likelihood of confusion requisite to prevail in an infringement action,
such usage could constitute dilution under the FTDA by diminishing the
capacity of the mark to identify or distinguish its corresponding goods
from those of others.56 However, the FTDA's incompatibility with the
unique challenges posed by the Internet quickly forced courts to stretch
the traditional dilution doctrine embodied in the Act to curb conduct by
cybersquatters who had "become increasingly sophisticated as the case
law.., developed" in insulating themselves from liability.57  In
particular, the mere speculative registration of a famous mark as a
domain name with the intent to sell it back to the mark's owner, but
without linking the contested domain name to a corresponding web site,
would neither create a likelihood of consumer confusion for an
infringement claim nor would it blur or tarnish the mark to constitute
dilution.58 In such a case, the consumer does not encounter the allegedly
offending domain name, and thus is not impacted by its identicality or
confusing similarity to a famous and distinctive mark.59 Moreover, no
consensus existed regarding whether this type of cybersquatting satisfied
the requisite "commercial use in commerce" of a famous mark,60 or
regarding which marks qualified as "famous and distinctive" within the
meaning of the FTDA.6' Indeed, while marks listed in the federal
register are per se distinctive, "[t]here is no place to go to find out if a
particular mark is 'famous.' There is no special register for famous
marks. Fame must be determined on a case by case basis in litigation.,
62
56. See, e.g., Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-
Ettelson Chevrolet, Inc., 855 F.2d 480, 485 (7th Cir. 1988); accord, Intermatic, Inc. v.
Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1239 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
57. Sporty's Farm v. Sportsman's Mkt., 202 F.3d 489, 4935 (2d Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 120 S. Ct. 2719 (2000) (quoting S. REP. No. 106-140, at 4 (1999); see, e.g.
Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1326 (9th Cir. 1998)) (concluding in a
cybersquatting case that, "[t]o find dilution, a court need not rely on the traditional
definitions such as 'blurring' and 'tarnishment'); see Blackman, supra note 57, at 218.
58. See Blackman, supra note 57, at 216, 218; see Lockheed Martin Corp. v.
Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 957 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
59. See Blackman, supra note 57, at 218.
60. Cf Panavision Int'l, 141 F.3d at 1326 (holding that trading on the value of
famous marks by registering them with the intent to sell them back to their rightful
owners constituted commercial use under the Lanham Act), with Lockheed Martin Corp.,
985 F. Supp. at 957 (ruling that mere registration of a trademark as a domain name,
without more, does not constitute commercial use under the Lanham Act).
61. MCCARTHY, supra note 7, at § 24:90; cf 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (requiring
marks to be both famous and distinctive to fall within the scope of the FTDA).
62. MCCARTHY, supra note 7, at § 24:90.
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Most significantly, the FTDA's shift to a property-based trademark
protection regime that primarily values the marketing function of
trademarks-free of any constraint posed by the consumer confusion-
based theories-paved the way for subsequent legislation and its UDRP
counterpart to further curtail the ability of domain names that match
marks to operate as a communicative message unimpeded by
overassertive trademark owners.
III. New Alternatives-Public and Quasi-Public Resolution of Domain
Name Disputes
Since 1999, the contemporaneous enactment of the ACPA and
implementation of the UDRP have afforded trademark owners
additional, alternative avenues of relief in order to mitigate the
expenditure and uncertainty attendant to litigating cybersquatting claims
under previously existing dilution and infringement theories. 63 Both the
ACPA and the UDRP specifically target the abusive registration of
trademarks as domain names by incorporating an expanded
cybersquatting dilution doctrine64 that retains some vestiges of traditional
infringement relief.65  However, the absence of previously existing
limitations on trademark infringement and dilution protection in these
two remedial schemes not only lowered the barrier to relief from
cybersquatting, but, in so doing, also facilitated the phenomenon of
reverse domain name hijacking by trademark owners seeking to suppress
legitimate expressive usage of domain names that otherwise would be
lawful under U.S. trademark infringement and dilution law.
A. The Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
Intended to protect consumer and American corporate interests, "to
promote the growth of online commerce, and to provide clarity in the law
for trademark owners,, 66 the ACPA alleviates the FTDA's substantive
63. H.R. Rep. No. 412, at 6 (1999) (observing that many trademark owners, when
faced with the prospect of litigating claims under existing trademark law, simply chose to
pay cybersquatters "extortionate prices ... in order to rid themselves of a potentially
damaging headache with an uncertain outcome").
64. See infra notes 69-79 & 101-110 and accompany text.
65. Compare, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(l)(B)(i)(V) (providing that bad faith intent
to profit may be shown by evidence demonstrating the defendant's "intent to divert
consumers from the mark owner's web site ... for commercial gain or with the intent to
tarnish .. .the mark, by creating a likelihood of confusion"), with UDRP Rule 4(c)(iv)
(providing that bad faith may be demonstrated by evidence that the domain name was
used with the intent "to attract" Internet users to the respondent's web site, "for
commercial gain. . ., by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark")
(emphasis added).
66. S. REP. 106-140, at 13 (1999) (Senator Orrin Hatch).
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obstacles to relief by neither requiring that a mark be famous nor that it
be used in commerce.67 Instead, the ACPA imposes civil liability for the
bad faith intent to profit from the registration, trafficking, or use of a
domain name that: (1) is identical or confusingly similar to a distinctive
mark; or (2) is identical, confusingly similar, or dilutive of a famous
mark.68
Consistent with the FTDA, the ACPA applies without regard to
whether the goods or services of the mark owner and alleged
cybersquatter are related, or whether there exists a likelihood of
consumer confusion.69 Under the ACPA, liability hinges on the presence
or absence of the domain name registrant's bad faith intent to profit from
the goodwill of another's famous or distinctive mark, determined under a
fact-intensive case by case assessment of nine non-exhaustive factors,7°
the first four of which weigh against a finding of bad faith,7' while the
remaining factors favor such a finding.72 The ACPA's enumerated
67. Id.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A).
69. Compare id. § 1125(c)(1), with 15 U.S.C. id. § 1125(d)(1).
70. Id. § l125(d)(l)(B)(i)(I)-(IX).
71. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I)-(IV). The ACPA lists the following non-exhaustive
factors indicating an absence of a bad faith intent to profit:
(I) any trademark or other intellectual property rights of the defendant in the
domain name;
(II) the extent to which the domain name is the defendant's legal name or
commonly used nickname;
(III) any prior use of the domain name by the defendant in connection with the
bona fide offering of any goods or services; [and]
(IV) the defendant's bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a site
accessible under the domain name.
Id.; S. REP. No 106-140, at 13 (1999); H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 10 (1999).
72. Id. § l125(d)(l)(B)(i)(V)-(IX). The ACPA lists the following non-exhaustive
factors as indicative of the existence of a bad faith intent to profit:
(V) the defendant's intent to divert consumers from the mark owner's web site
to a site accessible under the domain name that could harm the goodwill
represented by the mark, either for commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish
or disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of confusion as to the source,
sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the site;
(VI) whether the defendant has offered to sell the domain name to the plaintiff
for financial gain without having used or having intended to use the domain
name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services; or a prior
pattern of such conduct by the defendant;
(VII) whether the defendant provided false contact information in registering
the domain name or intentionally failed to maintain accurate contact
information, or a prior pattern of such conduct by the defendant;
(VIII) the defendant's acquisition of multiple domain names which the
defendant knows are identical or confusingly similar to the distinctive marks of
others or dilutive of the famous marks of others, which were distinctive or
famous at the time of registration of such domain names, without regard to the
goods or services of the parties; and
(IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the defendant's domain name
2004]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
scienter factors are calibrated to "balance[]the property interests of
trademark owners with the interests of Internet users who would make
fair use of others' marks or otherwise engage in protected speech
online."' 3 Accordingly, the ACPA lists the use of a domain name in
connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services, and the bona
fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a site accessible by the
domain name as indicative of the defendant's lack of a bad faith intent to
profit from the good will of the mark. Moreover, the ACPA
acknowledges the legitimacy of non-infringing concurrent use of marks
by multiple entities, "such as the use of the 'Delta' mark for both air
travel and sink faucets, 74 by requiring courts to consider whether the
defendant has any competing intellectual property rights to the mark.75
Drafted in response to tactics commonly employed by
cybersquatters, the ACPA's listed indicia of bad faith intent to profit
include the registrant's offer to sell a domain name to the mark owner for
commercial gain, but without having used or intended to use the domain
name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services; 76 the
registrant's intent to divert consumers from the mark owner's web site
for commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish the mark, by creating a
likelihood of consumer confusion; 77 the registrant's acquisition of
multiple domain names with knowledge that such names are identical or
confusingly similar to a distinctive mark or dilutive of a famous mark;
78
and the registrant's provision of false contact information. 79 The ACPA
further requires courts to consider whether a mark is both "distinctive
and famous" within the meaning of the FTDA, in recognition that such
marks should be entitled to a higher degree of protection than marks
which are merely distinctive. 80
Cognizant of the significant free speech implications posed by the
is or is not distinctive and famous within the meaning of the FTDA.
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1 125(c)(1)); S. REP. No. 106-140, at 14313 (1999); H. R. REP. No.
106-412, at 10, 11 (1999).
73. S. REP. No. 106-140, at 9 (1999) (Senator Orrin Hatch).
74. S. REP. No. 106-140, at 13; see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)().
75. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I). "Similarly, the registration of the domain name
'deltaforce.com' by a movie studio would not tend to indicate a bad faith intent on the
part of the registrant to trade on Delta Airlines or Delta Faucets' trademarks." S. REP.
No. 106-140, at 13.
76. 15 U.S.C. § l125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VI).
77. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(V).
78. Id. § l125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VIII).
79. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VII). This factor recognizes a ploy commonly used by
cybersquatters to escape service of process. See S. REP. No. 106-140, at 15.
80. Id. § 1125(d)(l)(B)(i)(IX); H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 13 (1999) (noting that
"[t]he more distinctive or famous a mark has become, the more likely [its owner] is
deserving of the relief available under this Act").
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ACPA, Congress incorporated an "explicit savings clause" providing that
bad faith "shall not be found in any case in which the court determines
that the person believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that the
use of the domain name was a fair use or otherwise lawful." 81 While
Congress intended this provision to make "clear that [the ACPA] does
not affect traditional trademark defenses, such as fair use, or a person's
first amendment rights,"82 the ACPA, in contrast to the FTDA,83 does not
expressly exempt legitimate noncommercial or fair usages of marks as
84domain names from its scope. Instead, the ACPA merely instructs
courts to consider such non-trademark uses as indicia of an absence of
bad faith,85 leaving this defense vulnerable to negation by the presence of
other bad faith factors.
86
B. The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
In order to afford trademark owners an expedited, inexpensive
means of resolving cybersquatting disputes, ICANN implemented the
UDRP in 1999 after receiving authorization by the DoC to assume
control over the management of the domain name system (DNS).87 The
UDRP, incorporated by reference in the registration agreements of all
accredited registrars, mandates that all domain name registrants in the
<.aero>, <.biz>, <.com>, <.coop>, <.info>, <.museum>, <.name>,
<.net>, and <.org> top-level domains submit to a non-binding mandatory
administrative proceeding upon any trademark owner's complaint to his
or her choice of ICANN-approved dispute resolution service providers88
that: (1) the contested domain name is identical or confusingly similar to
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii).
82. S. REP. 106-140, at 11 (1999).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(4)(A)-(C).
84. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii) (savings clause) and id.
§ 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I)-(IV) (fair and noncommercial use factors indicating an absence of
bad faith), with id. § 1125(c)(4)(A)-(C) (exempting the fair use of a famous mark by
another in comparative advertising; noncommercial use of the mark; and news reporting
from the scope of the FTDA).
85. 15 U.S.C. § l125(d)(l)(B)(i)(I)-(IV).
86. See, e.g., Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 270
(4th Cir. 2001) (concluding that "[a] defendant who acts even partially in bad faith in
registering a domain name is not, as a matter of law, entitled to benefit from the Act's
safe harbor provision" in order to avoid construing that clause "so broadly as to
undermine the rest of the statute").
87. Andrew R. Basile, Jr., Recent Developments: Intellectual Property Law and the
Internet, 584 PLI/PAT 293, 308-09 (1999).
88. The dispute resolution providers currently authorized by ICANN are the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO); The National Arbitration Forum (NAF); the
Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre (ADNDRC); and the CPR Institute for
Dispute Resolution (CPR). UDRP, available at http://www.icann.org/dndr/
udrp/approved-providers.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2004).
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a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; (2) the
domain name holder has no rights or legitimate interest in the domain
name; and (3) the domain name was registered and is being used in bad
faith.89 The complainant must prove all three factors to establish a prima
facie case against the respondent.
90
Regarding the third factor, a complainant may demonstrate the
respondent's bad faith by proving any one of four non-exhaustive
factors, which include a showing of circumstances indicating that the
registrant: (1) "acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of
selling.., the domain name [to the mark owner or the owner's
competitor] for valuable consideration"; (2) "registered the domain name
in order to prevent the owner... from [using its] mark in a
corresponding domain name, provided that [the registrant has] engaged
in a [prior] pattern of such conduct"; (3) "registered the domain name
primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor"; or
(4) has, "by using the domain name .... " "intentionally attempted to
attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to [his or her] web site. . ., by
creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark." Should
a complainant prevail, remedies are limited to the transfer or cancellation
of the domain name. 91
The UDRP purports to extend only to a "narrow, special class of
domain name disputes" involving clear cases of abusive
cybersquatting-in which the complainant has rights to use the mark as
part of a domain name and the respondent has none-and allows
respondents to overcome a complainant's prima facie showing by
demonstrating their "rights or legitimate interests" in the domain name. 92
However, neither the UDRP's jurisdictional or substantive limitations
adequately safeguard the legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the
mark by a domain name holder that would otherwise be lawful under
U.S. law.93 Indeed, the UDRP on its face and as construed by panelists
effectively facilitates the overassertion of trademark rights by mark
owners to suppress legitimate usage of the marks by others at little cost
to the trademark owner.
As a threshold matter, it is important to note that the UDRP itself
neither requires panelists to apply the law of any particular nation, nor
89. UDRP Rules 4(a)(i)-(iii), at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm (last
visited Sept. 13, 2004).
90. Id.
91. Id. Rule 4(b)(i)-(iv), at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm (last visited
Sept. 13, 2004).
92. See infra notes 101-103 and accompanying text.
93. See infra notes 101-112 and accompanying text.
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sets forth any choice of law guidelines for panelists.94 Rather, the UDRP
merely directs panelists to "decide a complaint.., in accordance with
the [UDRP and its attendant] Rules, and any rules and principles of law
that it deems applicable,"95 conferring broad discretion upon panelists to
apply a hodge-podge of governing law.96 While some panelists apply the
law of the country in which the parties are domiciled, 97 others either
merely apply the law of the panelists' country of origin98 or, more
commonly, refuse to consider any nation state's law in favor of resolving
the dispute exclusively in accordance with the UDRP rules.99 In many
cases involving competing trademark and fair or commercial use rights
to a domain name, the panelists' ruling on the applicability of U.S.
trademark and First Amendment law is dispositive to the outcome.100 As
illustrated below, a decision to consider only the UDRP rules represents
a decision to adhere to the lowest common denominator of trademark
law, which, as construed expansively by panelists, significantly enlarges
94. See UDRP Rule 15(a), available at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/uniform-
rules.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2004).
95. Id.
96. See id.
97. E.g., Bridgestone Firestone, Inc., v. Jack Meyers, WIPO Case No. D2000-0190
(July 6, 2000) (applying U.S. law in dispute between a U.S. corporation and a U.S.
resident), at 2000 WL 33674384; Ass'n of British Travel Agents Ltd. v. Sterling Hotel
Group Ltd., WIPO Case No. D2000-0086 (Mar. 29, 2000) (applying English law in case
involving English disputants in order to determine when a site is being "used" in bad
faith), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0086.html
(last visited Sept. 13, 2004); cf. Bett Homes Ltd. v. McFadyen, WIPO Case No. D2001-
1018 (Oct. 22, 2001) (finding U.S. fair use doctrine and First Amendment jurisprudence
inapplicable to a dispute between two residents of Scotland), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2001/d2OOl-lO18.html (last visited Sept.
13, 2004).
98. See Tourism and Corporate Automation Ltd. v. TSI Ltd., DeC Case No. AF-
0096 (Mar. 16, 2000), available at http://www.disputes.org/eresolution/
decisions/0096.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2004).
99. E.g., Este Lauder, Inc. v. Hanna, WIPO Case No. D2000-0869 (2000)
(declining to consider First Amendment issues in a dispute between two U.S. residents,
finding such inquiry irrelevant to a determination of whether the UDRP has been
violated), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-
0869.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2004); Compagnie Saint-Gobain v. Coin-Union Corp.,
WIPO Case No. D-2000-0020 (Mar. 14, 2000) (relying exclusively upon the UDRP to
resolve a dispute between a French complainant and a U.S. respondent), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0020.html (last visited July
29, 2003).
100. See id.; Espirito Santo Financial Group S.A. v. Colman, WIPO Case No. D2001-
1214 (Jan. 22, 2002) (distinguishing an earlier UDRP decision that "tum[ed] on [the]
application of the US doctrines of fair use and free speech," the panel observed that
"there is a clear divergence between Panelists applying rules and principles of US law
and those applying other principles"), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2001/d2001-1214.html (last visited July
29, 2003).
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trademark owner's rights to their marks.
First, in sharp contrast to the ACPA, the UDRP does not allow the
respondent a fair or noncommercial use defense unless the respondent
also shows that such alleged legitimate use was made "without intent for
commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the
trademark or service mark at issue.'"' ° Notably, by failing to expressly
limit tarnishment to acts done with intent to profit from the
complainant's mark, the UDRP enables panelists to deprive respondents
of a fair use defense even in cases involving legitimate expressive use of
the mark which, as noted above, while not actionable under U.S.
trademark law, may harm the mark's quality-connoting association and
thus leave the domain name subject to transfer under the UDRP.' °2
Although the only UDRP reference to tarnishment appears in one of
three non-exhaustive legitimate use defenses available to the
respondent,10 3 the UDRP provides no guidance regarding the proper
allocation of burdens of proof between complainant and respondent.
Consequently, as demonstrated below, this ambiguity has resulted in a
proliferation of cases in which the panelists shift the burden of proof on
the legitimacy issue to the respondent, effectively requiring the
complainant to merely demonstrate that the trademark and contested
domain name are "identical or confusingly similar" rather than to prove
all three elements of its prima facie case.10 4 Under this approach, any use
of the complainant's mark in conjunction with a site containing negative
commentary on the mark owner's enterprise may be pointed to as
evidence of a respondent's bad faith registration of the mark, rather than
as an element demonstrating his or her legitimate noncommercial use.
Second, and relatedly, notwithstanding ICANN's own attempt to
clarify that tamishment is limited to acts done with the intent to profit
commercially from the mark, 0 5 neither the UDRP's tarnishment-crippled
101. UDRP Rule 4(c)(iii) at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm (last visited
July 29, 2003); e.g., Kendall/Hunt Publ'g Co. v. Headhunter Bob, NAF Case No.
FAO I11000102247 (January 14, 2002), available at
http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/102247.htm (last visited July 29, 2003).
102. See, e.g., Kendall/Hunt, NAF Case No. FAO 111000102247 (Jan. 14, 2002), at
http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/102247.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2004).
103. UDRP Rule 4(c)(iii), available at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm
(last visited Sept. 13, 2004). Like the ACPA, the UDRP provides that a respondent may
also show a legitimate interest in the domain name by proving that the contested domain
name corresponds to the respondent's own name or is used in connection with a bona fide
offering of goods by the respondent. UDRP Rules 4(c)(i)-(ii).
104. E.g., infra notes 127-138, 161161-167 and accompanying text.
105. ICANN Second Staff Report, supra note 15, available at
http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-second-staff-report-24oct99.htm (Oct. 24, 1999) (last
visited Sept. 13, 2004). Acknowledging concern expressed by commentators that the
UDRP's reference to "tarnishment" in the respondent's fair use defense "might be
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fair use defense nor its bad faith provisions expressly require such for-
profit intent, in stark contrast to the ACPA's requisite "bad faith intent to
profit" from the mark. Accordingly, even legitimate noncommercial
usage of the mark may be swept into the UDRP's bad faith provisions.
Third, while the ACPA applies only to marks that are distinctive or
famous and limits the extraordinary protection afforded by the dilution
cause of action to famous marks (e.g. Kodak), the UDRP applies to any
mark, without regard to the strength of such mark. This is of particular
concern given the UDRP's incorporation of tarnishment in its fair use
defense. Under the UDRP, even legitimate noncommercial usage of a
domain name that tarnishes a generic mark (e.g. crew; prince, clue),
which otherwise would not be entitled to any trademark protection under
U.S. law, 106 may constitute bad faith registration and use of the mark
warranting transfer of the domain name to the mark owner.'
0 7
Significantly, at least one federal appellate court presciently recognized,
prior to the enactment of the ACPA and implementation of the UDRP,
that such indiscriminate extension of dilution protection to any mark
"would upset the balance in favor of over-protecting trademarks, at the
expense of potential non-infringing uses."' 1 8  Indeed, in that case the
court concluded that such extraordinary relief must be reserved only for
the most renowned marks in order to prevent dilution from becoming a
rogue law.'0 9
Finally, by incorporating tarnishment as a limitation on its fair use
defense, the UDRP necessarily encourages panelists to weigh the
trademark rights of the trademark owner against the fair or
misunderstood by those not familiar with United States law or might otherwise be applied
inappropriately to [legitimate] noncommercial uses," the Second ICANN Staff Report
pointed out that such tarnishment "is limited to acts done with intent to gain
commercially." Id. n.2 (citing UDRP Rule 4(c)(iii)). To date, the ICANN staff has not
taken "steps to publicize this point," notwithstanding its stated intent to do so. See id.
106. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992); see also
MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 12:46, at 12-93 (noting that affording generic terms
trademark protection through a showing of secondary meaning is the "aberrant" and
minority view).
107. See, e.g., LucasFilm Ltd. v. Cupcake City, WIPO Case No. D2001-0700, at 2001
WL 1701137 (Sept. 15, 2001) (refusing to consider respondent's contentions that
complainant's mark was merely generic, the panel noted "that such defenses are beyond
[its] purview" and that "the courts... are better able to grapple with the question of the
generic nature of words... and the acquisition of secondary meaning."); J. Crew Int'l,
Inc. v. crew.com, WIPO Case No. D2000-0054 (Apr. 20, 2000) (transferring "crew.com"
to trademark owner J. Crew Int'l, Inc.), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0054.html (last visited Sept.
13, 2004).
108. Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir. 1999).
109. Id.; accord, Viacom Inc. v. Ingram Enterprises, Inc., 141 F.3d 886, 891 (8th Cir.
1998) (quoting MCCARTHY, supra note 7, at § 24:108).
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noncommercial use rights of the domain name holder and thus to engage
in precisely the type of balancing of competing legitimate interests that is
beyond its jurisdiction. Emphasizing the narrow scope of the UDRP,
ICANN has explained that:
The adopted policy establishes a streamlined, inexpensive
administrative dispute-resolution procedure intended only for the
relatively narrow class of cases of "abusive registrations" [of domain
names]. The policy relegates all "legitimate" disputes-such as those
where both disputants had longstanding trademark rights in the name
when it was registered as a domain name-to the courts ... or to
arbitrators where agreed upon by the parties. "10
However, as demonstrated below, some UDRP panels have
effectively construed this limitation on their jurisdiction to refer only to
disputes involving competing legitimate intellectual property rights by
proceeding to adjudicate claims involving competing trademark and fair
or noncommercial use rights to a particular domain name,
notwithstanding the UDRP's requisite prima facie showing that the
respondent has no legitimate rights to the domain name. Worse, as some
commentators have observed, in such cases panelists tend to disregard
the respondents' asserted legitimate rights or interests by over relying on
the complainant's demonstrated trademark right,"' effectively rendering
a finding of identicality or confusing similarity between the mark and the
contested domain name dispositive to the outcome of the administrative
proceeding. 12 This is particularly so in cases in which panelists not only
equate identicality or confusing similarity with bad faith intent, but also
shift the burden of proof on the respondent to demonstrate his or her
legitimate interest in the domain name, and, in so doing, bypass the
requisite "no legitimate rights" showing that the UDRP imposes on the
complainant.
110. ICANN Second Staff Report, supra note 15, at 4.1(c); see Management of
Internet Names and Addresses, Statement of Policy, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,747 (June
10, 1998) [White Paper], available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/
domainname/6 5_98dns.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2004).
111. See Blackman, supra note 57, at 247 (quoting Bruce E. H. Johnson, Regulatory
Update: Internet Sheriffs Approach the Electronic Frontier, 624 PLI/PAT 397, 428
(2000) (criticizing Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Walsucks, WIPO Case No. D2000-0477, at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0477.html) (last visited Sept.
29, 2004)).
112. E.g., Spence-Chapin Services to Families & Children v. Wynman, NAF Claim
No. FA0110000100492 (Dec. 10, 2001), at 2001 WL 1707375 (Dec. 10, 2001)
(transferring domain name to trademark owner after equating identicality with bad faith
intent and requiring the respondent to prove he had a legitimate interest in the domain
name by showing no reasonable alternative existed to his selected name).
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IV. Misuse of the UDRP to Suppress Legitimate Fair or
Noncommercial Usage of Marks
A. Introduction
Corporations have recognized that the UDRP enables them to
exploit the bottlenecking function of domain name registrars in order to
assert a monopoly over any word that is similar to one of their
trademarks and, consequently, to suppress legitimate noncommercial or
fair usage of their marks by others by depriving them of their rightfully
owned domain names. In particular, the UDRP affords trademark
owners an extremely attractive means of quashing unflattering cyber
commentary directed at their businesses. For example, Walgreen's
recently filed a UDRP complaint against a thirteen-year-old who has
registered and used "wallgreen's.com" in conjunction with a web site
protesting the chain drug store chain's sale of cigarettes, ostensibly on
the basis that a drug store should profit only from the sale of curative or
innocuous products and not from the sale of products that it "know[s]
will injure or even kill Walgreen's customers."'1 13 The site, which posts a
disclaimer proclaiming that it "is not afiliated[sic] with Walgreens drugs,
DUH!," also contains drawings of three coffins labeled "RIP" above a
photo of the young domain name holder posed in front of rows of
cigarette cartons prominently displayed at the checkout counter of her
local Walgreen's store.114
In deciding to seek transfer of the domain name through a UDRP
administrative proceeding in lieu of court adjudication of the dispute,
Walgreen's not only avoids the cost and delay of litigation, but also may
avoid the more onerous burdens of proof posed by its alternative avenues
of relief under the Lanham Act and common law tort remedies-
limitations which, as noted above, may be constitutionally required under
the First Amendment. 15 In order to prevail in a defamation claim
seeking damages for harm to its commercial reputation, Walgreen's, as a
public figure, would have to prove not only the falsity of the speech at
issue, but also that the domain name holder acted with actual malice by
clear and convincing evidence.1 16 For that reason, in brick and mortar
cases corporations have recently attempted to "squelch speech on issues
of public concern" by relying upon section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,
113. Wallgreen's Cigarette Sales Protest Site, available at
http://www.wallgreens.com/letter.htmI (on file with author).
114. Id.
115. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
116. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 488-90
(1984).
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which imposes strict liability for making misleading statements of fact
that either create a likelihood of consumer confusion regarding the
source of goods or misrepresent the commercial activities of another in
commercial advertising or promotion.1 1 7  As discussed above, the
limitations posed by the Lanham Act for trademark infringement (e.g.
likelihood of confusion; commercial use) and dilution (e.g. fame of
mark; bad faith intent to profit) are stripped away in the UDRP, making
the UDRP an even more attractive option for trademark owners. Most
significantly, by coupling its fair use defense provision with a requisite
showing of no tarnishment, 1 8 the UDRP enables trademark owners to
silence even the non-defamatory non-commercial speech of their cyber
critics, which, while uncomplimentary and unwelcome, would otherwise
constitute protected speech under U.S. law.
119
Moreover, the UDRP's procedural mechanisms significantly
buttress the dispute resolution scheme's substantive advantages to
trademark owners both pre- and post-proceeding. First, under the
UDRP, complainants choose which of the four ICANN-approved private
dispute resolution providers will handle the proceedings, presided over
by either a one- or three-member panel appointed from the provider's
table of panelists.1 20 As a result, the UDRP not only creates an incentive
for the competing providers to render decisions favorable to potential
repeat player trademark owners, but, as discussed below, further
undermines the neutrality and perceived legitimacy of the process by
enabling complainants to significantly influence panel composition. 2
117. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); e.g., compare Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp.,
242 F.3d 539, 557 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 935 (2001) (declining to apply
actual malice standard in a Lanham Act claim), with World Wrestling Fed'n Entm't, Inc.
v. Bozell, 142 F. Supp. 2d 514, 523-24 & n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (declining to follow the
Fifth Circuit's decision to conclude that the actual malice standard applies in a Lanham
Act case (quoting Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (quoting New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)).
118. UDRP Rule 4(c)(iii), available at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm
(last visited Sept. 13, 2004).
119. See, e.g., L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 30-31 (1st Cir.
1987) (quoting Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech. Constitutional Implications
of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 158,
195-96 (1982)); Mission KwaSizabantu v. Rost, WIPO Case No. D2000- 0279 (June 7,
2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-O279.html
(last visited Sept. 13, 2004) (concluding that the respondent's use of the domain names to
link to a site expressing "alternative views and indeed critical views concerning the
Complainant ... amounts to tarnishing ... sufficient to fail point (d) of the test.").
120. See UDRP Rules 3(a),(b)(iv), available at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/
uniform-rules.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2004).
121. See supra notes 100-02 (explaining panel appointment process); Michael Geist,
Fair.corn? An Examination of the Allegations of Systemic Unfairness in the ICANN




Second, the UDRP allows losing respondents only ten days from the
date of the panel's decision to pursue a court order enjoining the
enforcement of the transfer in a court of "mutual jurisdiction" without
any comparable limitation on the complainant's rights.1 22 In the event
that a respondent manages to exercise this option, the independent
judicial resolution of the dispute expressly allowed by the UDRP does
not entail a traditional appellate review of the prior decision, because
such review lacks the "formal legal status" of "a court judgment or
arbitration award." 123  Rather, respondents must seek relief under an
independent source of applicable law such as the ACPA. 124 Moreover,
because neither party is precluded from raising additional claims in the
judicial proceeding, consideration of whether the respondent's conduct
complies with the ACPA may be merely incidental to "the legal
claims.., related to the parties' overarching dispute," "claims
potentially involving trademark and unfair competition law, contract law,
fraud, conversion, privacy and personality rights, free speech, due
process, [and] public policy. ,1 25 Consequently, while the ACPA may be
substantively more favorable than the UDRP to the cyber commentator,
neither the ACPA's injunctive relief provision nor the UDRP's
reciprocal "independent resolution" provision afford adequate redress to
the respondent forced to choose between costly litigation and foregoing a
rightfully held domain name.
Collectively, these factors have enabled complainants to prevail in
the overwhelming majority of UDRP cases, without significant risk that
an aggrieved domain name holder will be sufficiently motivated or able
to overcome the hurdles to judicial resolution of their dispute posed by
the exceedingly short filing period and prospect of costly litigation.
126
122. The UDRP requires trademark owners to agree to submit to such courts of
"mutual jurisdiction" upon submission of a complaint. UDRP Rule 3(xiii), available at
http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2004). A
"mutual jurisdiction" is defined as:
[A] court jurisdiction at the location of either (a) the principal office of the
Registrar (provided the domain-name holder has submitted in its Registration
Agreement to that jurisdiction for court adjudication of disputes concerning or
arising from the use of the domain name) or (b) the domain-name holder's
address as shown for the registration of the domain name in Registrar's Whois
database at the time the complaint is submitted to the Provider.
Id.
123. David E. Sorkin, Judicial Review of ICANN Domain Name Dispute Decisions,
18 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 35, 47 (2001).
124. See id.
125. Id.; see, e.g., Victoria's Secret Stores v. Artco Equip. Co., 194 F. Supp. 2d 704,
712 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
126. Indeed, while more than 4,333 domain name disputes have been decided since
1999, a Westlaw search revealed merely 16 post-UDRP judicial decisions rendered in
U.S. federal courts. See UDRP Outcome Data, available at
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This Part examines recent UDRP decisions in order to illustrate more
fully how the UDRP's expansive trademark protection, coupled with its
even more expansive construction by panelists, facilitates misuse of the
administrative proceedings by trademark owners to curtail the free
speech rights of registrants such as the teenage Walgreen's protester.
Specifically, this Part asserts that UDRP panelists not only exceed their
jurisdiction in deciding such cases, but in so doing, effectively confer
upon trademark owners an absolute property right to words that are
merely similar to their protected marks, without regard to important
competing legitimate rights that are protected by the UDRP.
B. UDRP Decisions in Favor of Complainants
UDRP panel decisions in favor of complainants in cases involving
disputes over the use of a mark in conjunction with a site containing
commentary on the mark owner's enterprise share common flaws which,
as noted above, stem from the UDRP's expansive provisions and its even
more expansive application in deference to asserted trademark rights.
Notably, this myopic focus on trademark rights often leads panelists not
only to conflate the requisite elements of the UDRP complainant's prima
facie case, but also to erroneously shift the burden of proof onto the
respondent to demonstrate a legitimate fair or noncommercial use of the
mark. This approach is best exemplified by Kendall/Hunt Publishing
Co. v. Headhunter Bob, in which the panelists transferred the domain
name "kendallhuntsucks.com," which the respondent had registered and
used to link to a criticism site after losing in a breach of contract action
brought against him by the complainant. 127 First, in concluding that the
domain name was "identical or confusingly similar" to the mark at issue,
the panel adopted the rationale articulated in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
MacLeod.128 In that case, the Wal-Mart panel distinguished the Lanham
Act's "likelihood of confusion" standard from the UDRP's "confusingly
similar" standard to conclude that the appendage of "-sucks" to a domain
name does not defeat a showing of confusing similarity under the
UDRP. 129 Emphasizing that "[n]o reasonable speaker of modem English
http://www.udrpinfo.com/dcsn.php (providing data for decisions through Feb. 18, 2002)
(last visited Sept. 29, 2004).
127. NAF Claim No. FAO111000102247 (Jan. 14, 2002), available at
http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/102247.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2004).
WIPO Case No. D2000-0662 (Sept. 19, 2000), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0662.html (last visited Sept.
29, 2004).
128. Id. (citing Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. MacLeod, WIPO Case No. D2000-0662 (Sept.
19, 2000), available at http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-
0662.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2004)).
129. Wal-Mart, WIPO Case No. D2000-0662 (Sept. 19, 2000), available at
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would find it likely that Wal-Mart would identify itself using wal-
martsucks.com," the Wal-Mart panel flatly rejected the complainant's
assertion that a domain name comprised of "a famous mark [and] a term
casting opprobrium on the mark" creates a likelihood of consumer
confusion "as to [its] sponsorship or association."'' 30  Surprisingly, the
Wal-Mart panel nevertheless found the domain name sufficiently similar
to the mark to satisfy the first prong of the complainant's prima facie
showing, finding the UDRP's "phrase 'identical or confusingly similar'
to be greater than the sum of its parts." 131 The Wal-Mart panel explained
that:
The Policy was adopted to prevent the extortionate behavior
commonly known as "cybersquatting," in which parties registered
domain names in which major trademark owners had a particular
interest in order to extort money from those trademark owners. This
describes Respondent's behavior. Thus, the Panel concludes that a
domain name is "identical or confusingly similar" to a trademark for
purposes of the Policy when the domain name includes the
trademark, or a confusingly similar approximation, regardless of the
other terms in the domain name. In other words, the issue under the
first factor is not whether the domain name causes confusion as to
source (a factor more appropriately considered in connection with the
legitimacy of interest and bad faith factors), but instead whether the
mark and domain name, when directly compared, have confusing
similarity. 132
Applying this reasoning wholesale, the Kendall/Hunt panel failed to
recognize that unlike the respondent before it, the respondent in Wal-
Mart had admitted his bad faith intent to register and use the domain
name at issue for the purpose of selling it back to the complainant.1 33 In
so doing, the Kendhall/Hunt panel extended the Wal-Mart panel's broad
reading of the identicality prong to a case that did not involve the bad
faith registration and use of a domain name, but rather its fair and





132. Id. (emphasis added); accord, Kendall/Hunt, Publ'g Co. v. Headhunter Bob,
NAF Case No. FAO1 11000102247 (January 14, 2002), available at
http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/102247.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2004).
133. Wal-Mart, WIPO Case No. D2000-0662 (Sept. 19, 2000), available at
http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0662.html (last visited
Sept. 13, 2004).
134. Kendall/Hunt Publ'g Co., NAF Case No. FAO I11000102247 (January 14,
2002), available at http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/102247.htm (last visited
Sept. 13, 2004).
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panel did concede "the use of a 'sucks' domain name may be justified by
fair use or legitimate noncommercial use considerations in the context of
free speech."'' 35 Nevertheless, after disturbingly shifting the burden of
proof on this issue to the respondent, it concluded that registration and
use of the contested domain name to criticize the complainant constituted
an intent to tarnish, and thus divested the respondent of its
noncommercial use defense.136 Moreover, in stark contrast to Wal-Mart,
the Kendhall/Hunt panel found no evidence of bad faith on the part of the
respondent to satisfy any of the UDRP's four bad faith factors.
37
Because those factors are non-exhaustive, the Kendall/Hunt panel
determined that the use of a domain name to effectuate "a personal
vendetta against the Complainant for the purpose of disparaging
Complainant's name and mark.., amounts to bad faith within the
meaning of the Policy."'
138
It is important to note that Kendhall/Hunt involved a default
proceeding, in which the panel chose to draw negative inferences from
the respondent's failure to reply.' 39 Nevertheless, the dissenting panelist
argued that "the defaulting Respondent should [have] prevail[ed],"
explaining that the contested domain name linked to a "classic parody
site set up to criticize the business activities of a trademark owner.'
' 40
Although he concluded that a domain name with "-sucks" appended
could not be confusingly similar to the mark it incorporates, and thus
obviates the need for further inquiry,'14 he pointed out that the "[m]ere
criticism of the trademark owner on the parody site does not constitute
bad faith or disparagement of the trademark. 1 42  On the contrary, he
reasoned that:
Even though the practice of putting "sucks" on the back of a
trademark is widely believed to be childish, at best, it is a protected
form of critical speech, absent bad faith attempts to divert customers
for commercial gain, extortion attempts to sell the site to the
trademark owner or its competitor or other manifestations of bad
135. Id.
136. Id. (citing UDRP Rule 4(c)(iii), available at http://www.icann.org/dndr/
udrp/policy.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2004)). The panel pointed out that "The Top Ten
Reasons NOT To Do Business With Kendall Hunt!" appeared on the respondent's site in





141. Id. (citing Bloomberg L.P. v. Secaucus Group, NAF Case No. FA 01040000
97077 (June 7, 2001), available at http://www.arbforum.com/domains/





In light of the example set forth by the Kendall/Hunt majority, it is
unsurprising that panelists asked to address the legitimacy of using
domain names that incorporate a mark without the appendage of a
disparaging suffix are even less receptive to respondents' free speech and
fair or noncommercial use defenses. Accordingly, some panels have
held that the right to free speech quite simply does not extend to the right
to use another's mark as a domain name.1 44 In Compagnie de Saint-
Gobain v. Com-Union Corp., the panel transferred the domain name
<saintgobain.net> after framing the issue presented not as one "of
freedom of speech and expression," but rather as one involving the "mere
choice of the domain name used to exercise this inalienable freedom of
speech and expression." 145  In that case, U.S. shareholders in the
complainant's French corporation had initially used the contested domain
name to link to a site criticizing the complainant's business practices, but
later self-censored the site 146 by replacing its contents with a brief history
of the Fort de Saint-Gobain as "a symbol of their freedom and dignity"
from "the oppression of the powerful. 147  Rejecting the respondent's
noncommercial use and free speech rights defense, the panel concluded
that:
Respondent could have chosen a domain name adequately reflecting
both the object and independent nature of its site, as evidenced today
in thousands of domain names. By failing to do so, and by
knowingly choosing a domain name which solely consists of
Complainant's trademark, Respondent has intentionally created a




144. See, e.g. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain v. Com-Union Corp., WIPO Case No. D-
2000-0020 (Mar. 14, 2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/
html/2000/d2000-0020.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2004); Espirito Santo Financial Group
S.A. v. Colman, WIPO Case No. D2001-1214 (Jan. 22, 2002), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2001/d2001-1214.html (last visited Sept.
13, 2004); Bett Homes Ltd. v. McFadyen, WIPO Case No. D2001-1018 (Aug. 21, 2001),
available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2001/d2OO l-l0 l8.html (last
visited Sept. 13, 2004).
145. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, WIPO Case No. D-2000-0020 (Mar. 14, 2000),
available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0020.html (last
visited Sept. 29, 2004).
146. Id. The respondents stated that they modified the site out of concern that, in
contrast to U.S. law, French law "does not equally recognize[]" shareholders' rights to
question the business model of corporations in which they have invested. Id.
147. Id. According to the respondents, the "fort de St. Gobain" sheltered "the
Picardian resistance ... against tyranny in the eleventh century." Id.
148. Id.
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Consistent with the approach taken by the Compagnie de Saint-
Gobain panel, in Estee Lauder, Inc. v. Hanna the panel held that the
respondent's fair use or free expression rights under U.S. law did not
confer upon him "a right or legitimate interest" to use the confusingly
similar domain name "estelauder.com" to link to a criticism site. 149 In
that case, the panel expressly acknowledged that, under U.S. law, the
respondent likely had fair use rights to employ the complainant's mark as
a domain name and "extensive free speech" rights to "provide a platform
to criticize" the mark owner. 50  The panel further opined that the
contents of the respondent's complaint web sites "may well be...
constitutionally protected in the United States."'' However, the panel
found U.S. principles of free speech and fair use protection owed to the
contents of a web site accessed via the disputed domain name irrelevant
to an assessment of whether the respondent had "rights or legitimate
interests" in the "domain name itself" under the UDRP's "more
restricted" standard. 152 Reasoning that the respondent "could well have
chosen to use a domain name that was not confusingly similar" to the
complainant's mark,1 53 the panel concluded that the respondent had no
legitimate interest in the contested domain name within the meaning of
the UDRP.
154
Moreover, the fact that the respondent's conduct failed to fall neatly
within any of the UDRP's bad faith factors did not hinder the Estee
Lauder panel in determining that the respondent's choice of a
confusingly similar domain name to access a complaint site evinced his
bad faith intent to "disrupt the business of a competitor. '155 Construing
''competitor" expansively to include any person "who acts in opposition
to another,"' 156 the panel concluded that, by employing a confusingly
149. Estee Lauder, Inc. v. Hanna, WIPO Case No. D2000-0869 (Sept. 25, 2000),
available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0869.html (last
visited Sept. 29, 2004).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. (citing UDRP Rule 4(a)(ii)) (emphasis added).
153. Id. (citing Compagnie de Saint-Gobain v. Com-Union Corp., WIPO Case No.
D2000-0020 (Mar. 14, 2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/
decisions/html/2000/d2000-0020.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2004); Gallo v. Hanna Law
Firm, WIPO Case No. D2000-0615 (Aug. 3, 2000), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.intdomains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-06 15. html (last visited Sept.
13, 2004); Bandon Dunes L.P. v. DefaultData.com WIPO Case No. D2000-0431 (July
13, 2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-
043 .html (last visited Sept. 13, 2004).
154. See id.
155. Id. (citing UDRP Rule 4(b)(iii)).
156. Id. (noting that the UDRP "does not imply or demand any restricted meaning
such as commercial or business competitor" (citing Mission Kwa Sizabantu v. Benjamin
Rost, WIPO Case No. D2000-0279 (June 7, 2000), available at
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similar domain name, the respondent "was clearly competing for the
attention of Internet Users" and that the "exclusively complaint
purposes" of his sites demonstrated his intent to disrupt the
complainant's business. 157 Notably, the Estee Lauder panel's expansive
construction of the UDRP effectively forecloses any possibility of using
a confusingly similar domain name to draw Internet Users' attention to
the subject matter of a complaint site.
Other panels, similarly relying on the distinction between the
protection owed to free expression and that owed to the method of its
delivery (via use of a domain name), have purported to soften the Saint-
Gobain approach by declining to articulate bright line rules that either
expressly prohibit the use of a mark alone as a domain name or that
require registrants to append a term "sufficient to immediately
convey.., an unmistakable, critical, and powerful negative
connotation."'' 58 For example, in Spence-Chapin Services to Families &
Children v. Wynman, the panel reasoned that, although registrants do not
have an "unbridled" right to use a trademark as a domain name, "panels
must tread quite carefully to ensure a proper balance is struck in
protecting the rights of trademark owners vis-A-vis not unduly restricting
a respondent's right of free speech."'
159
Nevertheless, the standard promulgated by the Spence-Chapin panel
imposes a near insurmountable burden upon registrants to demonstrate
any legitimate interest in a domain name that incorporates a mark.
160
Having determined that the domain name, which incorporated the
complainant's common law mark in its entirety, was confusingly similar
to that mark, the panel shifted the burden of proof onto the respondent to
demonstrate that he had a legitimate interest in the domain name at
issue.' 6' However, the panel rejected the respondent's noncommercial
use defense that he registered and used the domain name to link to a site
intended "for the dual non-commercial informational purposes" of
publicly criticizing the complainant's non-profit adoption programs and
"providing without compensation unbiased adoption information.' ' 62
Rather, the panel concluded that the "proper approach" in cases in which
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0279.html (last visited Sept.
13, 2004)).
157. Id.
158. Spence-Chapin Services to Families & Children v. Wynman, NAF Case No.
FA0110000100492 (Dec. 10, 2001), available at 2001 WL 1707375.
159. Id. (recognizing as "axiomatic, the [public's] well-established rights.., to
establish complaint websites for ... disseminating critical comment [of] ... commercial
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a domain name allegedly is used to support a complaint site requires the
assessment of "whether reasonable alternatives exist to the use of a
contested domain name that will still provide an effective avenue for a
respondent's critical comment."' 63  Under this approach, should the
respondent present a "sufficient factual showing.. . that no such
reasonable alternative exists," a panel "may conclude that a use is
legitimate" based on "the unique facts of the case." 164  By contrast,
"absent such a showing, a panel may conclude" that "the use is
illegitimate, 'possibly evincing bad faith."",1
65
Finding that the respondent adduced no such proof, the Spence-
Chapin panel then exacerbated the harsh consequences of its "reasonable
alternatives" standard by conflating the UDRP's requisite prima facie
showing of identicality with the scheme's bad faith factor, to conclude
that the respondent's mere choice of a domain name that was identical to
the mark at issue constituted bad faith. 166 According to the panel, by
choosing that particular domain name, "there can be no doubt of the
[respondent's] calculated intent to cause user confusion" and to thereby
harm the complainant's adoption service by diverting potential clients
"away from doing business with the complainant."1 67
The Spence-Chapin panel's rationale is problematic because it is
difficult to conceive of a situation in which a respondent would be able
to prove that no reasonable alternative exists to the use of a particular
domain name incorporating a mark. Although the Spence-Chapin panel
had opined that domain names containing a communicative suffix with a
negative connotation (e.g., trademarksucks.com) would preclude
consumer confusion, and thus would ostensibly defeat the threshold
identicality showing, 68 as demonstrated above, other panels routinely
analyze identicality without any consideration of consumer perception to
conclude that disparaging suffixes do not preclude a finding of confusing
similarity.' 69  Should a subsequent panel apply this more lenient
163. Id. (finding it "eminently reasonable" to shift the burden of proof onto the
respondent in such cases because "the facts that might exonerate the respondent's
conduct are within the control of the respondent") (citing Meijer, Inc. v. Porksandwich
Web Services, NAF Case No. FA97186 (July 6, 2001), available at
http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/97186.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2004));
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Bums, WIPO Case No. D2001-0784 (Oct. 1, 2001),
available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2001/d2001-0784.html (last
visited Sept. 13, 2004)) (emphasis added).





169. E.g., Kendall/Hunt Publ'g Co. v. headhunterbob, NAF Case No.
FAO1 11000102247 (Jan. 14, 2002), available at http://www.arbforum.com/
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identicality standard and additionally require the respondent to prove that
no reasonable alternatives exist to the chosen domain name, even the
small universe of communicative domain names incorporating marks that
the Spence-Chapin panel envisioned as fair game for cyber
commentators would instead be subject to the exclusive use of trademark
owners.
Moreover, by both relieving the complainant of proving that the
respondent had no legitimate interest and equating identicality with bad
faith, the Spence-Chapin panel joined the Compagnie Saint Gobain and
Estee Lauder panels in effectively requiring the complainant to prove
only the first element of its prima facie case. Given the onerous burden
imposed by the Spence-Chapin panel upon the respondent, a finding of
identicality was ultimately dispositive to the outcome in that proceeding.
Notably, the rationale shared by the Compagnie Saint Gobain, Estee
Lauder, and Spence-Chapin panels that the mere choice of a confusingly
similar domain name constitutes bad faith is indiscernible from the
"preemptive registration" theory of bad faith, which at least one federal
court has flatly rejected.170 Under that theory, a registrant's use of a
confusingly similar domain name evidences a bad faith intent to prevent
a mark owner from fully exploiting the use of its mark as a domain
name. However, in Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc.,
the court concluded that the mere possession and use of a confusingly
similar domain name, without more, constitutes neither infringement
171
nor dilution under U.S. law.
172
To prevail in an -infringement claim, the mark owner must
demonstrate that the defendant both used the domain name to identify a
source of goods and promoted the domain name in a way that created a
likelihood of consumer confusion, 173 neither of which were satisfied in
the above UDRP cases. Moreover, in rejecting the contention that
impeding the mark owner's ability to establish a presence on the Internet
is dilutive of its mark, the Lockheed Martin court admonished that:
All prior domain name registrations corresponding to words in a
trademark impede the trademark owner's use of the same words for
use as a domain name. The Intemet, however, is not exclusively a
medium of commerce. The non-commercial use of a domain name
that impedes a trademark owner's use of that domain name does not
domains/decisions/102247.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2004). See supra notes 128-134
and accompanying text.
170. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 956 (C.D.
Cal. 1997).
171. Id. at 957.
172. Id. at 960.
173. Id. at 956.
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constitute dilution [sic] use of the mark.
17 4
Nevertheless, despite some variations in the expansive approaches
taken in the above UDRP proceedings, the decisions collectively hinge
on the extent to which the choice of a particular domain name impedes
the ability of the trademark owner to effectively exercise an absolute
property right to his mark. As demonstrated above, the trademark
owners' ability to assert a monopoly over any word contained in a
domain name that resembles his mark against arguably protected fair use
or free speech rights to the domain name is facilitated by the UDRP's
coupling of tamishment and legitimate noncommercial use in its defense
provisions. By construing its express provisions expansively and
exercising broad discretion to articulate and allocate complainant-
friendly burdens of proof, the panelists assist in creating a virtually
impermeable boundary around the most desirable and intuitive domain
names.
C. UDRP Decisions in Favor of Respondents
In contrast to the expansive approaches taken by panelists in the
above cases, a minority of panels has held that respondents' use of marks
as domain names to link to non-commercial commentary sites constitutes
a right or legitimate interest in the domain name under the UDRP. In
cases in which the respondent prevails, panelists have uniformly declined
to alleviate complainants of the requisite three-prong prima facie
showing and have strictly construed the UDRP's provisions to avoid
recasting fair or noncommercial uses of a domain name as infringing or
diluting conduct. While some panels have reached this result by relying
in part upon U.S. fair use and free speech law, others have done so by
strictly adhering to the UDRP. For example, in Civic Development
Group v. Schaffer, the panel relied exclusively upon the UDRP to hold
that the respondent had a legitimate interest in the contested domain
name for use in connection with a complaint site exposing the
complainant's allegedly "unethical and misleading" fundraising
tactics.175 The respondent, a college student and former employee of the
complainant, posted information as a "public service" on actions brought
against the complainant by the Federal Trade Commission and state
agencies, cautioning the public that the complainant retained 80% of the
donations it collected on behalf of police departments and other civic
groups. 176
174. Id. at 960 (emphasis added).




The Civic Development panel found that the complainant did not
meet its burden on any of the requisite elements of a UDRP prima facie
showing. 177 First, the panel concluded that the domain name was not
confusingly similar to the mark 178 because the web site accessed via the
contested domain name contained critical commentary on the
complainant's enterprise, and thus, Internet users would instantly
recognize that the site was not sponsored by the complainant. 1'7 9 Second,
the panel found no evidence to rebut the respondent's asserted legitimate
interest in the domain name; the respondent provided an informational
service to the public at no charge, and thus, made a fair or
noncommercial use of the mark as a domain name under the UDRP. 180
Emphasizing that the domain name dispute resolution process was "not
designed to resolve other disputes that may exist between the parties,"
the panel instructed the complainant that it retained any rights it might
have to pursue a claim against the respondent for alleged defamation in
another forum. 18'
Finally, the Civic Development panel found that the "evidence
completely failed to demonstrate bad faith registration and use."' 82 The
respondent never attempted "to sell, rent, or extract anything of value"
from the complainant.1 83 Nor did his conduct evince "a bad faith intent
to disrupt the complainant's business" under the UDRP, which requires
that the alleged disrupter be a competitor of the complainant. 8 4 Flatly
rejecting the broad construction of "competitor" relied upon by the Estee
Lauder panel in favor of the term's "ordinary dictionary" definition,
"business rival,"' 185 the panel found that the respondent, a student who
was not engaged in business, was not the complainant's competitor.
186
The panel observed that "efforts to inform the public about
177. Id. (citing UDRP Rules 4(a)(i)-(iii), available at http://www.icann.org/dndr/
udrp/policy.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2004)).
178. Id. (citing UDRP Rule 4(a)(i), available at http://www.icann.org/dndr/
udrp/policy.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2004)). Curiously, the panel also found that the
mark was generic, and thus entitled to no trademark protection, yet proceeded to analyze
the case under all three prongs of the complainant's prima facie showing. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. (citing UDRP Rule 4(c)(iii), available at http://www.icann.org/dndr/
udrp/policy.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2004)).
181. Id.
182. Id. (citing UDRP Rules 4(b)(i)-(iv), available at http://www.icann.org/dndr/
udrp/policy.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2004)).
183. Id.
184. Id. (citing UDRP Rule 4 (b)(iii), available at http://www.icann.org/
dndr/udrp/policy.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2004)).
185. Id. (citing WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY (2d ed.)).
186. Id. (citing Mission Kwa Sizabantu v. Rost, WIPO Case No. D2000-0279 (June 7,
2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0279.html
(last visited Sept. 13, 2004)).
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Complainant's activities may indeed be disruptive," but that impact
"does not," in itself, "entitle Complainant to relief under the Policy.'
' 87
Moreover, there was no evidence to support a finding of intent to divert
Internet users, for commercial gain, by creating a likelihood of
confusion.' 88 The complainant neither demonstrated that the site was
intended for a commercial purpose nor that there was a likelihood of
consumer confusion posed by a site that "clearly set forth materials
critical of the Complainant's business activities."1
89
In some contrast to the approach taken by the Civic Development
panel, the panel in Bridgestone Firestone v. Myers referred to U.S. fair
use and free speech principles by analogy to inform its construction of
the UDRP.' 90  In that case, the respondent registered <bridgestone-
firestone.net> to use with a website criticizing the complainant for
allegedly having failed to pay his pension.' 9' Although the panel quickly
concluded that the domain name was identical or confusingly similar to
the mark, it ruled that the use of a mark as a domain name to link to a
website providing "criticism and commentary about the Complainants
constitutes legitimate noncommercial use and fair use within the
meaning of the Policy.' ' 192 Relying upon the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp.,
193
the panel emphasized that the "fair use doctrine applies in cyberspace as
it does in the real world."' 194 Specifically, such "fair use could include
the use of a trademark to identify the trademark holder's products in
certain circumstances."' 195  Because the Brookfield court rejected the
defendant's fair use defense on the basis that he had made a commercial
use of the mark at issue, 196 the Firestone panel found the respondent's
noncommercial use of the mark for commentary to be more analogous to
the circumstances presented in Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v.
187. Id.
188. Id. (citing UDRP Rule 4(b)(iv).
189. Id.
190. Bridgestone Firestone v. Myers, WIPO Case No. D2000-0190 (July 6, 2000),
available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0190.html (last
visited Sept. 13, 2004) (noting that "two of the Complainants are U.S. corporations,
Respondent is a U.S. resident, and both parties have cited U.S. law in their submissions").
191. Id.
192. Id. (citing UDRP Rule 4 (c)(iii), available at http://www.icann.org/dndr/
udrp/policy.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2004)).
193. 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
194. Bridgestone Firestone v. Myers, WIPO Case No. D2000-0190 (July 6, 2000),
available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-O190.html (last
visited Sept. 13, 2004) (quoting Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1065).
195. Id. (citing Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1065).
196. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1066.
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Faber.197 Observing that the Bally court recognized "both fair use and
free speech as defenses to trademark infringement and dilution in the
Internet context," the panel adopted the federal district court's rationale
that a defendant cannot exercise his right "to publish critical
commentary" about a mark owner's corporation without making
reference to the mark.198 Moreover, the panel agreed that the speech was
"protected by the First Amendment," and that as such, a defendant can
use "[a] mark to identify the source of the goods or services of which he
is complaining.' ' 99  The panel further joined the Bally court in
concluding that this particular type of source identifying use "is
necessary to maintain broad opportunities for expression. 2 °°
Notably, in so doing, the Firestone panel eschewed rigid line-
drawing between source identifying and communicative functionality of
domain names, a distinction that has led some federal courts to conclude
that whether a domain name constitutes protected speech depends on the
presence or absence of a communicative element such as "sucks"
appended to the mark.20 1 Instead, the panel shared the Second Circuit's
more recently articulated view that domain names are neither "per se
entitled to nor excluded from ... First Amendment [protections],"
therefore the "appropriate inquiry" requires a case by case analysis of the
circumstances presented "with respect to each domain name. 20 2
Declining to articulate a bright line rule requiring the use of such a
communicative element, the panel did find that such highly "fact-
intensive analyses on issues of trademark infringement and dilution are
beyond the scope of [a UDRP] proceeding and are better carried out by
arbitrators or courts.,2  However, in limiting its inquiry to whether the
respondent's conduct constituted a legitimate interest under the UDRP,
the panel concluded that, although not expressly listed in the UDRP, the
exercise of free speech for criticism or commentary also constitutes a
"legitimate right or interest" 204 that defeats a UDRP claim for transfer of
the domain name. According to the panel, this is so because "the same
facts establishing fair use and the exercise of free speech negate a finding
197. 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1998). Accord Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1065.
198. Bridgestone Firestone v. Myers, WIPO Case No. D2000-0190 (July 6, 2000),
available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0190.html (last
visited Sept. 13, 2004) (citing Bally, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1165, 1167).
199. Id. (citing Bally, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1165, 1167).
200. Id. (citing Bally, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1165, 1167).
201. Id. (citing OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176 (W.D.N.Y.
2000)).
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of bad faith intent., 20 5
V. A Proposal for Substantive and Procedural Reform of the UDRP
A. Substantive Modifications
As demonstrated above, the UDRP's incorporation of tamishment
in the respondent's fair or noncommercial use defense not only enables
trademark owners to quash speech that is otherwise protected under U.S.
law, but also necessitates a fact-intensive evaluation of competing rights
that is ill-suited to an expedited scheme expressly intended to reserve
such balancing to judicial or arbitral resolution.2 °6 Accordingly, the "no
tarnishment" limitation on the respondent's legitimate interests defense
should be eliminated from the UDRP or, alternatively, moved to the
complainant's prima facie burden as a bad faith factor, but with two
significant modifications. First, any inclusion of a tarnishment action
must be coupled with a requisite showing of a "bad faith intent to profit,"
in order to inhibit panels from equating tarnishment with negative, yet
lawful, commentary. 0 7 This can be accomplished most effectively by
simply adopting an umbrella "bad faith intent to profit" standard that
applies to all bad faith factors, to avoid panelist confusion.0 8
Second, a respondent's asserted use of the domain name for the
purpose of providing commentary should give rise to a rebuttable
presumption that the respondent is making a fair or noncommercial use
of the mark. To overcome this presumption, the complainant should
have to demonstrate that the allegedly disparaging speech is:
(1) commercial speech; (2) exercised by a commercial competitor of the
complainant; and (3) with the bad faith intent to profit from the mark by
inciting consumers to purchase the respondent's goods or services.
20 9
Such an approach, analogous to one articulated by the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York in a section 43
Lanham Act claim, 210 "protects the First Amendment rights of
noncompetitors who comment upon or criticize a company's goods or
services, as well as competitors and noncompetitors who comment on
205. Id. (citing Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528, 535-36
(E.D. Va. 2000)).
206. ICANN Second Staff Report, supra note 15, at 4.1 (c); see Blackman, supra note
57, at 243.
207. Blackman, supra note 57, at 243-244.
208. Id.
209. Gordon & Breach Sci. Publishers S.A. v. Am. Inst. of Physics, 859 F. Supp.
1521, 1532-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
210. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (imposing strict liability for false or misleading
statements made in comparative advertising or which cause a likelihood of confusion).
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matters of public concern.,, 2 11 Because these factors overlap with other
bad faith factors already contained in the UDRP when properly
construed,1 2 the addition of these qualifications on tarnishment should
not prevent the proceedings from being conducted in an expedited
manner.
Finally, disciplined construction of the UDRP's bad faith provisions
is necessary to avoid prohibiting the respondent's legitimate
noncommercial use of domain names, a result at odds with its fair or
noncommercial use defense and ICANN's stated intent.213 This is
particularly so when, as discussed above, panelists decline to restrict
their construction of "competitor" to "business competitor," and intent to
"commercially gain" to conduct from which the respondent hopes to
derive a monetary benefit. Such expansive construction of the UDRP's
bad faith provisions removes the scheme's already paltry limitations on
trademark owner's rights and renders even legitimate noncommercial use
of the domain name virtually indistinguishable from abusive
cybersquatting.
B. Procedural Modifications
This Part proposes that, in order to prevent asserted trademark rights
from effacing respondents' competing legitimate interests in domain
names, the UDRP needs four procedural modifications designed to
provide a neutral forum and to harness panelist discretion in the decision-
making process. First, the UDRP's panel appointment process should be
amended to ensure greater participation by respondents because, as noted
above, the extent to which complainants influence panel composition
significantly enhances their success rate in UDRP proceedings. At
present, if a complainant opts for a one-member panel without objection
by the respondent, the complainant-designated provider will appoint the
panelist who decides the case.214 By contrast, in three-member panel
211. See Deanne E. Maynard & Katherine A. Fallow, et. al., Misuse of the Lanham
Act to Silence Speech, 19-FALL Comm. Law. 3, 5 (2001) (endorsing the Gordon &
Breach approach to analyze of brick and mortar false and disparaging speech claims
brought pursuant to the Lanham Act).
212. See, e.g., UDRP Rule 4(b)(iii) (providing that registration of "the domain
name ... primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor" evidences
bad faith); id. at 4(b)(iv) (providing that a showing that the respondent, "by using the
domain name, . . . intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users
to [her] web site .. ") (alteration in original) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2004).
213. ICANN Second Staff Report, supra note 15, at 4.1 (c); White Paper, supra note
110, at 31,747; supra notes 109-112 and accompanying text.
214. UDRP Rule 6(b), available at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/uniform-
rules.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2004).
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cases, the complainant-designated provider chooses two panelists from
among candidates proposed by both parties, with the third chosen by the
provider from a list of five that it submits to the parties for their input.
215
Notably, of the more than 4,333 cases decided since 1999, complainants
have prevailed in 82.68 % of the disputes over which a one-member
panel has presided, a win rate that drops to 58.27% in cases decided by
three-member panels.216 This disparity may also be attributed to the
likelihood that three-member panel decisions in close cases are the
product of debate and reflection, rather than merely the opinion of a solo
panelist.
Yet, because the respondent must pay half of the fees for a three-
member panel that serves at his or her request, fees that otherwise would
be paid in their entirety by the complainant for his or her choice of
panels, the respondent is dissuaded from exercising this option.217
Accordingly, the UDRP should be amended to require that all disputes be
presided over by three-member panels paid for by the complainant, with
an option to reduce the panel to one member if the respondent defaults.
Alternatively, the fees for a three-member panel could be shared by the
parties, with a fee-shifting provision requiring the complainant to pay all
costs upon a finding that the mark owner engaged in reverse domain
name hijacking.
Second, the UDRP should be amended to afford adequate guidance
to panelists, whose exercise of broad discretion not only risks the over-
expansion of trademark protection, but results in inconsistent decision-
making that can have a chilling effect on speech.218 Thus, the UDRP
should clarify its choice of law provision, either by requiring panelists to
rely exclusively upon its Rules, or by providing a streamlined set of
conflict of law rules to avoid the arbitrary and inconsistent application of
law, which in some instances bears no relation to the parties or the events
that gave rise to the complaint.219 For example, the UDRP could specify
215. Id. at Rule 6(e), available at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm
(last visited Sept. 13, 2004).
216. UDRP Decision Outcome Data, available at http://www.udrpinfo.com/dcsn.php
(providing outcome data of decisions through Feb. 18, 2002) (last visited Sept. 13, 2004).
In a recent study, Professor Michael Geist attributed the high complainant win rate to
panel composition, after finding that the disparate results were not due to "substantively
stronger respondent cases in three-member panel [proceedings]," nor other factors such
as the percentage of cases in which respondents defaulted. Geist, supra note 121, at 2,
19-20.
217. See UDRP Rule 19(a), available at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/uniform-
rules.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2004).
218. Blackman, supra note 57.
219. See, e.g., Tourism and Corporate Automation Ltd. v. TSI Ltd., DeC Case No.
AF-0096 (Mar. 16, 2000), available at http://www.disputes.org/eresolution/
decisions/0096.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2004) (observing that panelists often simply
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that, in disputes between domiciles of the same country, their country's
law should inform the construction of UDRP provisions that are
susceptible to interpretation. In cases involving parties from different
countries, panels should refer to the respondent's national law because
the UDRP binds the respondent, but not the complainant, to submit to a
mandatory UDRP proceeding upon complaint of any trademark owner,
anywhere in the world, that the respondent has engaged in abusive
cybersquatting.
Third, the UDRP should provide panelists with adequate guidance
on how to allocate the burdens of proof by clarifying that the
complainant must prove all three elements of his prima facie case before
the panel examines whether the respondent has made a legitimate fair or
noncommercial use of the mark. At that point, a respondent should be
able to overcome the complainant's prima facie showing by
demonstrating a legitimate interest in the domain name, which per se
establishes that he or she has a competing right, thus taking the case
outside the panel's jurisdiction.
Fourth, post-proceeding modifications should include an extended
deadline to file an action in court to enjoin the enforcement of a UDRP
order to transfer or cancel a domain name. As demonstrated above, the
mere ten days allowed the respondent to pursue such an action is unlikely
to be adequate to select an attorney and prepare the requisite pleadings.
In addition, the UDRP should provide a clear statement that panel
decisions are non-binding, without any precedential effect in subsequent
judicial proceedings. 2 ° While the First Circuit has held that the UDRP's
independent judicial resolution provision contemplates a de novo review
of panel decisions, and declined to accord any deference either to the
conclusions of law or the findings of fact of the panelist,221 more recently
one federal district court adopted a UDRP panel's fact-finding before
conducting a de novo review of the legal issues presented.2 22  Still
another district court summarily concluded that review of UDRP
decisions must be conducted under the Federal Arbitration Act's
apply the law of their country of origin).
220. See Weber-Stephen Prods. Co. v. Armitage Hardware & Bldg. Supply, No. 00 C
1738, 2000 WL 562470, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 2000) (observing that "[n]either the
ICANN Policy nor its governing rules dictate to courts what weight should be given to a
panel's decision").
221. See, e.g., Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, 273 F.3d 14, 26-27 (1st
Cir. 2001); Strick Corp. v. Strickland, 162 F. Supp. 2d 372 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Cf Weber-
Stephen Prods., No. 00 C 1738, 2000 WL 562470, at *2 (concluding that it was not
bound by a UDRP panel decision but declining to "determine the precise standard by
which [to] review the panel's decision, and what degree of deference (if any) [to] give
that decision").
222. Victoria's Secret Stores v. Artco Equip. Co., No. C-2-01-198, 2002 WL 484078,
at * 1-2 (S.D. Ohio March 27, 2002).
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extraordinarily narrow review.223 Finally, some courts have cited to
UDRP decisions to support their conclusions,2 24  suggesting that,
notwithstanding their utterances that UDRP decisions have no
precedential value,225 at the very least they have been relied upon as
persuasive authority.226 This is of particular concern given the UDRP's
expansive trademark protection, which may ultimately infiltrate U.S.
trademark law.
C. Alternative Solutions
Although the above proposals, if adopted, would assist in ensuring
the fairness, consistency, and legitimacy of the UDRP administrative
process, they do not address the root of the problem: a scarcity of the
most desirable, intuitive domain names. In order to harmonize the
conflict between domain names and trademarks, several changes to
current methods of domain name allocation and use are in order. For
example, the adoption of a new gTLD to be used exclusively in
connection with domain names linking to noncommercial, informational
sites, from which respondents derive no revenue-whether from the sale
of its goods or services, or from click-through ads, links, or otherwise,
could help to preserve the availability of a forum of free speech to cyber
commentators. An appropriate name would be <.noncom>, which
immediately conveys the noncommercial nature of the site. Similarly,
the use of a <.us.tm> gTLD, reserved only for U.S. registered
trademarks, would afford mark owners an exclusive web neighborhood
within which they could exploit their marks. Such an approach has
already been implemented with success in France for French trademarks.
Relatedly, increased reliance on country code domains, such as
223. Strasberg v. Dluhos, No. 00-CV-3163, 2001 WL 1720272, at *11-12 (D.N.J.
Aug. 31, 2001) (citing 9 U.S.C.A. § 10 (1999)).
224. E.g., PACCAR, Inc. v. TeleScan Tech. L.L.C., 115 F. Supp. 2d 772, 777 (E.D.
Mich. 2000) (noting that a UDRP panel had previously determined in a separate dispute
brought by the plaintiff that "kenworthtruck.com and kenworthalley.com were.., likely
to cause confusion with PACCAR's marks" to conclude the same in the case at bar)
(citing PACCAR Inc. v. Enyart Assoc., WIPO Case No. D2000-0289 (May 26, 2000),
available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0289.html (last
visited Sept. 13, 2004)).
225. E.g., Sallen, 273 F.3d at 26 (concluding that a judicial decision overrides a
UDRP administrative determination, which "should not have (and cannot have) the effect
of binding precedent in national courts") (quoting The Management ofInternet Names
and Addresses: Intellectual Property Issues: Final Report of the WIPO Internet Domain
Name Process 150(v) (Apr. 30, 1999), available at http://wipo2.wipo.int/processl/
report/finalreport.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2004)); Weber-Stephen Prods. Co., 2000
WL 562470, at *2.
226. See PACCAR, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d at 777; see also Weber-Stephen Prods. Co.,
2000 WL 562470, at *2.
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<.us.com>; or <.co.uk> could help alleviate the challenge posed by the
concurrent lawful use of marks as domain names by multiple mark
owners operating in different geographic regions. Thus, while
<habitat.co.uk> could sell furniture at its English website,
<habitat.us.com> could sell New York apartments at its site. In addition,
competing legitimate users of domain names could share the opening
page of a website, which would act as a gateway with links to their
respective official websites. This approach is exemplified by the web
page shared by Hasbro, which owns the rights to the game Scrabble in
the U.S. and Canada, and Mattel, Inc., which owns the rights to Scrabble
"throughout the rest of the world., 227  Internet users who enter
<www.scrabble.com> into their browsers are thus presented with a page
which posts an explanation of the companies' mutual affiliation with the
game and invites users to click on the official site of the company that
they seek. 28
Finally, some companies recently have begun selling Keywords, "an
additional layer on top of the Domain Naming System protocol," which,
in contrast to domain names, consist only of companies' and brand
names "without the www's, dashes, symbols and dot-whatever
extensions of URLs.,2 2 9  Thus, an Internet user who simply enters
"trademark" into a browser, without a gTLD, will automatically access
the official site of the trademark owner.23°  One such service,
RealNames, avoids the difficulties posed by the first-come first-served
method of allocating domain names by allowing only the Keyword
registration of words, which "direct end users to content that the
Keyword review team believes end users would ... expect to discover at
the site. 231  Accordingly, the company's policy would not grant the
Keyword "Delta" to Delta Faucets, because "the overwhelming user
expectation for the Keyword Delta is Delta Airlines. 2 32 Significantly,
RealNames strives to prevent cybersquatting by verifying applicants'
asserted trademark rights to requested Keywords prior to approving their
assignment and by "manually reviewing" applications for "highly
227. http://www.scrabble.com (last visited Sept. 13, 2004).
228. Id. The posted explanation provides:
SCRABBLE® is a registered trademark. All intellectual property rights ... to
the game are owned in the U.S.A. and Canada by Hasbro Inc., and throughout
the rest of the world by J.W. Spear & Sons Limited of Maidenhead, Berkshire,
England, a subsidiary of Mattel Inc. Mattel and Spear are not affiliated with
Hasbro.
Id.
229. RealNames' Keyword Policy, available at http://www.realnames.com/





PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
trafficked terms., 233  Nevertheless, in theory the system permits
concurrent use of a particular Keyword by multiple trademark owners
because Keywords are operable "only in those countries" selected by the
mark owner at the time of registration, permitting eligible mark owners
234in other countries to use the same word. Because Keywords represent
perhaps quintessential intuitive domain names, increased reliance on
their use may very well reduce competition between trademark owners
and cyber commentators over a finite number of desirable ordinary
domain names.
VI. Conclusion
While the UDRP affords trademark owners an expedited,
inexpensive alternative to judicial resolution of domain name disputes
involving clear cases of abusive cybersquatting, it is not, nor was it
intended to be, a panacea for all types of disputes between trademark
owners and domain name registrants. Indeed, it is precisely because the
UDRP was designed to relegate to the courts all cases other than those in
which the respondent has no competing legitimate rights that the scheme
is particularly ill-suited to the adjudication of disputes between mark
owners and cyber commentators. These disputes necessarily require a
balancing of asserted intellectual property rights against fair use or free
speech rights to the contested domain name. "The Internet is above all a
framework for global communication,2 3 5 and, as such, enables both
trademark owners to disseminate information about their products and
"individual citizens of limited means [to] speak to a worldwide audience
on issues of concern to them., 236 Disputes between these groups over the
right to use a particular domain name are nearly indistinguishable from
traditional brick and mortar cases between trademark interests and
consumer advocates.
Yet, rather than afford a revolutionary cure-all, the UDRP
exemplifies how the prospect of designing a scheme to handle challenges
posed by technological advances too easily makes us forget the first
principles of the rights protection we strive to maintain. Justice Holmes
reminds us of the historic limitations on trademark rights: "When the
common law developed the doctrine of trade-marks and trade-names, it
was not creating a property in advertisements more absolute than it
233. Id.
234. See id.
235. Bridgestone Firestone, Inc. v. Myers, No. D2000-0190 § 6, (WIPO Jul. 6, 2000),
available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0190.html (last
visited Sept. 13, 2004).
236. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 881 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd,




would have allowed the author of Paradise Lost. As currently drafted
and construed, however, the cybersquatting dilution theory embodied in
the UDRP does indeed have that result.
237. Chadwick v. Covell, 23 N.E. 1068, 1069 (Mass. 1890).
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